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及び他のすべての勢力に対して伝えることである（In our judgment the best hope of 
preserving peace is that the conviction should be carried to the U.S.S.R., Turkey and 
all other powers that in case the United Nations is unsuccessful in stopping Soviet 
aggression, the United States would not hesitate to join other nations in meeting 
armed aggression by the force of American arms.）」と述べられていた。10
この内容についてアチソンの説明を聞いたトルーマン大統領は、トルコ問題が米ソ間
の戦争を導きかねないことを確信した。アチソンがさらにソ連政府への伝達案を読み始
めると、「これ以上聞く必要はない。それを送付しよう」と述べ、11 「今から5 ～ 10年間
はソ連が世界支配を追求しようとしているか否かを探るほうがよさそうだ（We might 
as well fi nd out whether the Russians were bent on world conquest now as in fi ve 
years or ten years.）」と指摘した。12
8月19日、アメリカ政府はソ連政府に対して覚書を送付し、黒海両海峡の防衛の主た










10  FRUS, 1946., vol. VII, pp. 840-842. The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State at Paris, 15 August 
1946. 
11  Millis, op. cit., p. 192; Feis, op. cit., p. 182.
12  Ambrose and Brinkley, op. cit., p.71. 
13  1936年にスイスのモントルーで開催され、モントルー条約が調印された会議。
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　（ encouragement of Turkey to purchase nonmilitary material and supplies that 
would strengthen Turkey’s and military position）
〇トルコ軍の防衛力強化のための武器、軍用機、他の軍用装備の購入の許可 
　（ permission for Turkey to buy arms, military aircraft, and other military 
equipment to strengthen economic the defensive abilities of its armed forces）
〇トルコ軍を支援するため将校を含む選抜されたアメリカの専門家の派遣の検討
　（ consideration of the sending of selected US technicians, including offi  cers, to 



















15  Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff  to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of Navy, Enclose to JCS 
1704/2,24 August 1946, CCS 092 (8-2246) set 1, 参照：FRUS, 1946, vol. VII, pp. 857-858.










（ successful opposition to Soviet eff orts against Turkey rested primarily on the 
continuation of the will of the Turkish Government and people to take a fi rm 
stand against Russian demands） 
b） 米国民はトルコの実情をよく知らないが、どのような有効策も最終的には米国
民の理解・支持によって決まる
（ the US public was not well informed concerning the situation in Turkey 




（ Great Britain’s immediate security interest in the situation was even more 
acute than that of the United States）
だが、このJCSの覚書に述べられていた認識は、国際連合組織を通じた米ソによる国
際管理を目指していた国務省にとっては、自らの対ソ基本路線を否定しかねないもので
16  Ibid, 原文は、Strategically Turkey is the most important military factor in the Eastern Mediterranean and 
Middle East. She is one of the few national entities and the only nation now possessing, according to best 
available information, a fi rm resolution to oppose the apparent Soviet policy of expansion in the area. While 
lacking an effective navy and air force, Turkey possesses a rugged and considerable ground army which, 
particularly if properly equipped and supported, is capable of off ering material resistance, even to the Soviets, 
if the nation is attacked. If Russia attains military dominance of Turkey by political concessions, her military 
threat is projected so that there is grave doubt that, in case of a major world crisis, the Middle East and 
Eastern Mediterranean could be considered military tenable for the non-Soviet powers. Furthermore, the 
faith and political reliance in the major non-Soviet powers of the Middle Eastern peoples and nations on 
the periphery of the “iron curtain” is considerable although intangible factor in U.S. security. This faith and 
reliance will be gravely aff ected if not dissipated by success of Soviets in their present political venture in the 
direction of the Turkish Straits. The logical result is a further weakening of the present stand of those nations, 
including Great Britain, peripheral to the “iron curtain”, against Soviet pressure and expansionist policy. From 
the military standpoint, the Joint Chiefs of Staff  view with concern the present world situation. In spite of the 
written word of the United Nations’ Charter, many and major indications point to a calculated Soviet policy of 
expanding Soviet de facto geographical and political control. Such a Soviet policy has the most serious impact 
on the vital interests of the United States.




























17  FRUS, 1946, vol. VII, pp. 209-213., 12 September 1946,  原文は、“This communication brings us face to face 
with a problem which we appear to have been approaching for some time. That problem is whether in view 
of the policy which the Soviet Union appears to be pursuing of endeavoring to undermine the stability and to 
obtain control of the countries in the Near and Middle East such as Greece, Turkey and Iran, we should make 
certain changes in our general policies,. . . relating to the sale of combat equipment, to an extent which might 
enable us to strengthen the will and ability of the various Near and Middle Eastern countries under Soviet 
pressure to resist that pressure.” 
18  SC/R-184, 5 February 1946; SWNCC 202/2, 21 March 1946; FRUS, 1946, vol. I, pp. 1141-1142, 1145-1160, 
footnote 63, p. 1145. 原文は，“In accordance with the United States’ fi rm political policy of aiding the countries 
of the Near and Middle East to maintain their independence and develop sufficient strength to preserve 
law and order within their boundaries, it is consistent with United States policy to make available additional 
military supplies, in reasonable quantities, to those countries.”

































19  FRUS, 1946, vol. VII, pp. 209-213.











価によって決まる。（The world is watching the support or lack thereof which we 
furnish our friends at his critical time and the future policies of many countries will 
be determined by their estimate of the seriousness or lack thereof with which the US 












20  Ibid., pp. 223-224., 24 September 1946, 原文は、“It was natural that consideration of such assistance should 
some months ago have been determined largely on the basis of need, capacity to repay, and general attitude 
of the recipient country towards our important aims and methods of expanding world trade. The situation has 
so hardened that the time has now come, … in the light of the attitude of the Soviet Gov’t and the neighboring 
states which it dominates in varying degrees, when the implementation of our general policies requires the 
closest coordination. In other words, we must help our friends in every way and refrain from assisting those 
who either through helplessness or for other reasons are opposing the principles for which we stand. I have 
in mind particularly two countries which it is of the highest importance for us to assist, Turkey and Greece. 
… I am in full accord with the reasoning contained in that document and with its conclusions. I discussed the 
question of Turkey with Bevin on Saturday and suggested that Britain, in view of her alliance with Turkey, 
might wish to furnish direct military equipment while the United States render all feasible economic assistance 
through sale of surplus, credits. If the Turks should request a few selected technicians I should favor granting 
the request.”
21  Ibid.
22  Ibid., footnote 76.





















23  Ibid., pp.894-897.　原文は、“… It is, therefore, the policy of the United States give positive support to Turkey. 
This policy should be implemented along the following main lines:  1. Diplomatic. The United States should 
maintain the firm, though reasonable, position it has already take with regard to the Straits. If and when 
occasion arises it should adopt a similarly fi rm stand with regard to other issues, such as the Soviet desire 
to annex parts of eastern Turkey.  The Turks, the Soviets and the world at large should be legt in no doubt 
whatsoever as to our stand with regard to such questions.  2. Moral. The United States Government should 
continue to make clear to the American people the essential elements of the situation, explaining carefully the 
moral as well as political and strategic bases of our policy. At the same time, we should make sure that the 
Turkish Government and people also fully understand our position and are confi rmed in their belief that we 
are determined to see the high principles of the United Nations maintained with regard to Turkey. We must 
especially avoid any action which, reasonable or expedient though it might seem to us, would give the Turks 
the impression that we were weakening in our support or deviating from our principles.  3. Economic. A 
beginning in economic assistance has been made through the authorization of a $25,000,000 Export-Import Bank 
credit and by assistance in the purchase of vessels to rehabilitate the Turkish merchant marine. This beginning 
must be followed up by all available means, probably including additional financial credits but not limited 
to this form of assistance.  4. Military. For the present it seems preferable for Great Britain to assume the 
obligation of providing military equipment and munition of the Turkish military forces. This follows because of 
the treaty relationship between the two countries and because the world in general has become accustomed to 
the fact that Turkey receives arms from Britain from time to time. If a case should arise where Britain is not 
in a position to furnish the necessary arms and military equipment, the United States government is prepared 
to consider the possibility of furnishing such supplies to Great Britain for delivery to the Turks. In a very 
exceptional case we might consider furnishing certain supplies direct.   It is not inconsistent with United States 
policy, however, to provide technical military advice, military instructions, etc., whenever requested by the 
Turks.
































24  Ibid., pp.515-516.




extent dose the Joint Chiefs of Staff  consider Iran to be an area of vital strategic 
interest to the United States for defensive or counter-off ensive purposes, or as a 
source of supply?）
2 ．どのように、JCSは、イランにおける合衆国の戦略的利益を、中近東地域全体
の合衆国の戦略的利益と関連させるべきと考えているか。（In what way does the 
JCS consider the United States strategic interest in Iran to be related to United 
States strategic interest in the Near and Middle Eastern area as a whole?）
3 ．どのように、JCSは、以下のそれぞれの場合について、合衆国の戦略的利益に
影響が及ぶと考えるか。（In What manner dose the JCS consider that United 
States strategic interest would be aff ected by:）
（a） 北部をソ連の勢力圏に南部をイギリスの勢力圏とするイランの分割 （A 
division of Iran into a Soviet sphere of influence in the north and a British 
sphere of infl uence in the south?）
（b） アゼルバイジャン地域のソ連の永久支配 （Permanent Soviet control of the 
Iranian province of Azerbaijan?）
（c） イラン北西部とイラン北部の隣接地域を含む、ソ連の影響下のクルド自治国
家の創設 （The creation of a Soviet-dominated autonomous Kurdish state which 
might include contiguous portions of northwestern Iran and northern Iraq?）
（d） 全イランのソ連支配 （Soviet domination of the whole of Iran?）
4 ．現存の能力不足のイラン治安部隊と中央政府の権限を強化するという政治的望
ましさを考慮し、JCSは合衆国のイラン軍創設支援計画が合衆国の中近東地域に
おける戦略的利益の防衛に寄与すると考えるか。（Given the existing inadequacy 
of Iranian security forces and the political desirability of strengthening the 
authority of the central government, dose the JCS consider that a program of 
assistance by the U.S. to the Iranian military establishment would contribute to 





25  SM-6874-46 to SWNCC, 11 October 1946 (derived from JCS 1714/3) , CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec 1.; FRUS, 1946, vol. 
VII, pp.529-532.






がある（As a consideration apart from such assumption, it must be realized that the 
interests of the United States and its military capabilities would be adversely aff ected 
by loos of Middle East oil occurring through possible Soviet domination of Iran by 
means other than war.）」と述べ、イランは主要な石油供給源であるが故に、アメリカ
にとって軍事的に「重要な戦略的利益」であると結論付けていた。
JCSは、国務省の第1の問いであるイランの戦略上の重要性について、「供給源（石
油）としてイランは合衆国の重要な戦略利益の地域である（as a source of supply (oil) 
Iran is an area of major strategic interest to the United States）」こと、「反撃作戦に
関しては、ソ連の重要産業が間近にあることが、東地中海―中東地域を抱えることの
重要性を疑いの余地のないものとしている。ここは反撃行動にとって有用な僅かばか
りの地域の一つである （As to counteroff ensive operations, the proximity of important 
Soviet industries, makes the importance of holding the Western Mediterranean-
Middle Eastern area obvious. This is one of the few favorable area of counteroff ensive 
action.）」ことなどを指摘した。
更に第2の問いである中東地域との戦略上の関連については、「イランにおける合衆
国の戦略利益は中近東地域の合衆国の利益と密接に関係する（United States strategic 
interest in Iran is closely related to Unites States strategic interest in the Near and 






ことが合衆国の戦略的利益である（Loss of the Iraq and Saudi Arabia sources to the 
United States and her allies would mean that in case of war they would fi ght an oil-
starved war. Conversely, denial of these sources to the USSR would force her to fi ght 
an oil-starved war. However, due to Russia’s geographic position, great land mass, and 
superior manpower potential, any lack of oil limiting air action by United States and 
her allies or hampering their transportation ability or their war production would be 
of great advantage to the USSR. It is therefore to the strategic interest of the United 
States to keep Soviet infl uence and Soviet armed forces removed as far as possible 
from oil resources in Iran, Iraq, and the Near and Middle East.）」と主張した。
JCSは先に国務省が3番目の問いで設定していた4つの可能性についても個々に評価















by the United States to the Iranian military establishment would probably contribute 
to the defense of United States strategic interest in the Near and Middle East by 
creating a feeling of good will toward the United States in central government of Iran 











た「現時点では、これ以上、認められた軍備政策の例外措置はない（That no further 
exception to existing arms policy would be authorized at this time.）」としながらも、
国務省は「現行の政策である、武器及び軍備政策に、合衆国の利益になることが明らか
な場合、国務長官は現行の政策の方針を変えることができるとの言葉が加えられる（The 
language would be added to the existing policy Arms and Armament Policy which 
would make it possible for the Secretary of State to depart from existing policy when 
it was clearly in the interests of the United States to do so.）」ことを確認していた。26
26  FRUS, 1946, vol. VII, p.255.























27  Ibid, p.533-536.
28  Ibid., pp.546-560.
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